Too Concentrated to Fail

A Supply Chain Concentration Risk Framework for Healthcare Digital Infrastructure

Autores/as

  • Shashank Bharadwaj Independent Researcher, Asta CRS Inc., United States.
  • Rethish Nair Rajendran Technical Delivery Manager, Unisys Corporation, United States

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.66838/sauc.6485

Resumen

The February 2024 ransomware attack on Change Healthcare halted claims, eligibility, and pharmacy transactions across much of the United States health system. Ninety four percent of surveyed hospitals reported financial impact, 74 percent reported direct effects on patient care, and recovery ran for months. The event was both a cybersecurity failure and a concentration failure, and concentration is what turned one firm's outage into a sector-wide stoppage. Healthcare had routed a critical share of national administrative transaction flow through a single intermediary, a single-sourcing decision that supply chain management has treated as a first-order risk for decades, without importing the risk management apparatus that discipline built around it. This paper develops that diagnosis into a usable instrument.......

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Publicado

2026-09-10

Cómo citar

Shashank Bharadwaj, & Rethish Nair Rajendran. (2026). Too Concentrated to Fail: A Supply Chain Concentration Risk Framework for Healthcare Digital Infrastructure. Street Art & Urban Creativity, 12(5s), 8–17. https://doi.org/10.66838/sauc.6485

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Artículos de investigación