Formal Logic, Representation and Intuition
The limits of classical representation and intuition of abstract objects
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37467/revvisual.v9.5020Keywords:
Intuition, Representation, Images, Formal Logic, Mathematics, Abstract ObjectsAbstract
The Philosophical study of the representation of mathematical objects requires a prior definition of what we mean by intuition. In this article I introduce an argument that shows why we cannot represent every conceptually manipulable object. To reach this conclusion I will admit that there are certain abstract objects that cannot be apprehended intuitively. In order to do so, I will historically review their characterisation and formal definition. Finally, I will establish an updated basis on which to initiate a specific study of the role of object representation in formal science.
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