



THE THRESHOLD OF DISRUPTION:

Assessing the Social Impact of Technologies such as Sora

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ABSTRACT

In the digital era, social media and disruptive technologies have transformed the ways in which we interact, consume information, and learn. These innovations have opened new possibilities but have also posed significant challenges, particularly for younger generations. The recent introduction of Sora, OpenAI's video-generating artificial intelligence, followed by other Generative Artificial Intelligences (GAI), adds an even more unsettling dimension due to its potential to generate radical and disruptive societal changes. Against this backdrop, understanding the impact and consequences of technological disruptions and assessing their societal repercussions is crucial. To this end, the authors introduce the concept of the Disruptive Factor (Fd), a tool designed to measure and analyse the impact of these disruptive technologies. This approach seeks to raise awareness of the risk/benefit ratio associated with AI and disruptive technologies in general, and to promote informed debate about their regulation and responsible use.

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1. Introduction

This study discusses the disruptive potential of prompt-based generative video technologies, such as OpenAI's new Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI), Sora, launched for public use in December 2024, which represents the emergence of such technologies as a potential pathway towards a new individualism, almost a solipsism, and to new, potentially unsettling, and likely irreversible changes in the entertainment creation industry (Parikh, 2024). However, other authors argue the contrary, suggesting that such disruptions need not necessarily be negative (Păvăloaia & Necula, 2023).

Generative AI brings with it the possibility of significant transformation in certain creative industries, and it was one of the reasons behind the strike called in the USA by the WGA (writers) and SAG-AFTRA (actors) unions in 2023 (Ding, 2024). This technology could potentially lead to job losses and economic destabilisation—an AI can write a script in seconds or clone an actor—but it also raises the risk of users falling into absolute solipsism (Hoyos, 2012). With the proliferation of so-called “self-movies,” instantaneous cinematic works born from a user's prompt in which the protagonist can be the creator of the prompt itself, a cult of the ego—already intensely fostered by social media culture (Hampton & Chen, 2021; Li, 2016)—could be promoted, potentially having profound societal repercussions.

Users, increasingly immersed in personalised experiences and algorithms that reinforce their preferences and biases, a culture of the “self” above all else, could gradually construct tailor-made digital universes, informational and experiential bubbles acting as distorting mirrors that reflect and amplify their own perspectives and echo chambers of thought. Such dynamics could lead to an unprecedented form of paradoxically connected social isolation, where interaction with others is mediated and filtered by successive layers of technology that prioritise bias confirmation—individualism—over intellectual challenge. Generative AI platforms, by enabling the creation of content perfectly aligned with individual desires and expectations, could exacerbate this trend towards a technological solipsism in which shared reality fragments into myriad personalised experiences, each perfectly tailored to the user but fundamentally disconnected from a common frame of reference; this phenomenon may have psychological counterparts framed in what is termed Creative Displacement Anxiety (Caporusso, 2023), a process by which individuals relinquish the intimacy of their creation to technology, which would, in some way, become the arbiter of their lives and the generator of personal, non-transferable references to other human beings.

Regarding the impact on the entertainment industry, we may be facing a historical turning point whose ramifications we are only beginning to glimpse. The democratisation of AI-based creation tools, particularly in the audiovisual field with technologies like Sora, has the potential to destabilise traditional content production and distribution structures: no workers, intermediaries, cameras, work teams, or scriptwriters are needed. This paradigmatic shift would not only affect the economic and labour aspects of the audiovisual industry but would also raise fundamental questions about the very nature of creativity and authenticity in the digital era. Until now, the artist has been the paradigm: a person, but now a technology can do it without fitting the definition of a person. The ability to generate high-quality audiovisual content with minimal human intervention—a suitable prompt suffices—could lead to market saturation with AI-generated content, where the distinction between the authentically human and the artificial becomes increasingly blurred. This would pose not only economic challenges for traditional creators—industry workers—but also profound questions about the cultural value of art and entertainment in a world where creative scarcity has been replaced by artificial abundance, potentially leading to a homogenisation of cultural content driven by algorithms and engagement metrics rather than a human artistic vision. Both aspects are two sides of the same coin and feed into each other: the user's ego is fuelled in an individualistic vortex, while their own actions—enabled by an entirely new AI industry—diminish or even eliminate traditional audiovisual industries, as they become unnecessary and even uneconomical.

Meta has announced the advent of its own prompt-based AI video technology, MetaGen, analogous to Sora (Márquez, 2024), followed by other similar technologies, such as Google DeepMind's Veo 2, with which some users are already creating their own films; such is the case of *The Heist*, a short film directed by developer Jason Zada (2024). The author states:

Each shot of this film was created via text-to-video with Google Veo 2. Thousands of generations were needed to produce the final film, but I am absolutely impressed by the quality, consistency,

and fidelity to the original prompt. When I described “raw 1980s New York,” it delivered beyond expectations—CONSISTENTLY. While this is still not perfect, it is undoubtedly the best video generation model out there by far. Additionally, it is important to note that no visual effects, retouching, or colour correction were added. Everything comes straight from Veo 2. (Zada, 2024).

From viewing the short film, despite its limitations, a remarkable capacity for constructing a coherent and visual narrative is evident, which could significantly influence the near future, both positively and negatively. Throughout history, there have been numerous prior innovations—disruptive in nature—in communication media that did not have the negative consequences society initially feared or even led to unexpectedly positive outcomes. A paradigmatic example of this was the invention of the printing press in the 15th century, which provoked great fear about what it would mean for everyone to read and access information (Hellings, 2019), or the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th–19th centuries, which led to opposition movements, such as Luddism. It is undeniable that each era faces its own technological and social disruptions, which are often initially met with scepticism.

However, a radical difference is highlighted by historian Yuval Noah Harari: the innovative characteristic of generative AI is that it is not merely a technology but also an agent, as defined by Harari, a process capable of generating new knowledge, new texts, new images, new expressions, and thus new ideas—admittedly based on those from training data, but this is also how new ideas emerge among humanity, building on prior ones—automatically (Harari, 2024). Never before has such a powerful technology been within humanity’s reach. This power, still largely unexplored due to its recent introduction into societies, could have yet unknown consequences, not all of which are positive.

Nevertheless, the positive side of these technologies can be found, as Kustudic & Mvondo (2024) indicate, in aspects such as competitive improvements in producing certain moving images, accessibility to certain content, increased quality of content offered on social media, cultural and scientific dissemination, generation of previously impossible content due to high costs, or a democratisation of creation. We are dealing with a technological category so disruptive that, alongside the benefits it may bring, intrinsic challenges arise from image generation, including forgeries, creation of works without human intervention to minimise audiovisual entertainment production costs, and maximum adaptation to the viewer’s desires and needs to the point of rendering cinematic language unintelligible to others, among other issues.

On the negative side, cinema, a collaborative art that fosters diverse perspectives and exploration of the human world, would cease to do so when generated by non-human devices; this could lead to a scenario glorifying the individual, becoming a distorted reflection of our own vanities. Recently, Amazon decided to limit self-published books to three per day per author, as most are written by ChatGPT and other similar generative text AIs (Lacort, 2024). Independent writer Caitlyn Lynch warned that only 19 of the 100 best-selling books on Amazon in the “Contemporary Romance” category were written by humans. The remaining 81 were written by generative AI (Teresch, 2023). One can imagine what could happen soon when Sora and other generative video AIs become freely available to the public.

Given the critical importance of such an irruption, which only adds to a continuous series of technological disruptions that seem endless since the early 21st century, the authors propose a scenario in contemporary societies where a disruptive technology can generate profound and unexpected transformations in humanity’s social, cultural, political, informational, and communicational spheres (Hopster, 2021). In this context, they propose a quantitative measurement system to facilitate qualitative decision-making, aiming to confirm or refute the hypothesis posed and offer an intuitive, easily interpretable tool to identify which audiovisual GAI technologies, capable of generating images from prompts without any human intervention, actors, cameras, locations, or technical and artistic teams, all based on adequately trained neural networks, could pose greater risks to societies. The suggested method constitutes an initial contribution to the broader debate on evaluating the potential social influence of certain disruptive technologies.

2. Discussion.

Drawing on previous technological disruptions observed in recent years, we know that social media, particularly short-video platforms like TikTok or Instagram, have a powerful capacity to capture our attention and reduce our concentration spans (Schellewald, 2021); they are deliberately designed to create addiction through algorithms protected by industrial rights, making them unverifiable. Additionally, the flood of ephemeral information and constant visual stimulation they provide hinders both information retention and comprehension of lengthy texts. These dynamics could pose significant challenges for users, who in the future will also face the implications of the often legally questionable handling of their personal data on these networks.

The decline in attention span and difficulty processing complex information can have a negative societal impact, particularly in education (Carlsen et al., 2010). University students, the first generation to reach higher education with a strong dependence on these platforms, may face difficulties with tasks previously considered straightforward for students, from reading and understanding lengthy texts to conducting critical analysis, developing complex ideas, or writing reflectively (Marino et al., 2018). These competencies, traditionally assumed as basic skills for any university student, now pose challenges for many, and some lack them entirely (Zambrano et al., 2025). This context creates a global scenario demanding comprehensive analytical approaches and systemic solutions.

Disruptive technological events since the advent of the smartphone have transformed how we learn, relate, converse, or exchange culture and ideas—all defining traits of what makes us human as a civilisation. While these new disruptive technologies, such as the generative AIs discussed in this text, offer new opportunities for education and knowledge transmission, they also present challenges in serious and risky matters for the normal functioning of a society and the health of its citizens, such as access to disorganised and not always truthful information, constant distractions, superficial learning, or the loss of critical thinking skills. Generative artificial intelligence would significantly exacerbate these digital-era problems, as its ability to produce seemingly coherent and convincing content on an unprecedented scale would flood digital spaces with information that, while superficially plausible, lacks the depth and rigour characteristic of genuinely grounded knowledge, contributing to the proliferation of a superficial understanding of the environment, current affairs, history, or what is true and what is fictitious: users, faced with an avalanche of artificially generated content presented attractively and easily digestible, tend to settle for simplified explanations and quick answers instead of engaging in deeper processes of investigation and reflection (Manghani, 2024). This dynamic is aggravated by the fact that generative AIs, capable of instantly producing responses to any question in the form of moving images—with documentary value—could create cognitive dependency. The ability of generative AIs to produce personalised content based on individual preferences would contribute to the creation of increasingly hermetic parallel visual realities, and most importantly: indistinguishable from what appears real, creating a kind of “fictitious soup” generated by a technology that does not understand what it does and cannot distinguish what is real from what is not (Mvondo & Niu, 2024).

Indeed, concerns about this are beginning to emerge in the literature (Kustudic & Mvondo, 2024), as certain social media platforms are demonstrating an increased capacity to generate anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem in vulnerable population sectors due to the proliferation of these technologies. Another consequence is cyberbullying, a problem affecting both young people and adults, with serious mental health implications. Added to this is the significant increase, with total indifference from those responsible for social networks and disruptive technologies—who bear no inherent responsibility—in disinformation and fake news. The proliferation of false information is a societal challenge and can have significant negative consequences (Sineviciene et al., 2021), particularly with generative video AIs, which can create fake documentary images in seconds or deepfakes, generating false statements from all kinds of personalities and images that could pass as real, taking disinformation to a new, unprecedented level of risk (Hadi Mogavi et al., 2024).

Finally, generative AIs and social media collect vast amounts of personal data, posing risks to citizen privacy; there is no control or responsibility surrounding these data, how they are traded, or their subsequent use. In the current scenario, one must ask: How many disruptive technologies can a healthy society withstand? And how much can some of them influence our society? With digital-native students entering the early years of higher education, we may begin to experience the effects of some of these disruptions on their psyches (Marengo, 2022).

For these reasons, the authors argue that societies must recognise and address the disruptive impact that certain technologies can exert on their structure and functioning. They also consider it time to implement concrete measures when such impact reaches significant levels that could compromise social, cultural, or political well-being.

In this study, a specific objective criterion called the Disruptive Factor (Fd) is proposed, designed as a metric to evaluate the impact of a disruptive technology on a society. This approach focuses particularly on artificial intelligences dedicated to generating audiovisual content, considered one of the most recent disruptions in our contemporary societies. The authors propose this concept in the form of an arithmetic formula that allows for systematic and comparative quantification and analysis of its effect.

$$Fd = (Ca + Dv + Rp) / Tr \quad (1)$$

Let us define the variables involved in (1). The numerator includes four variables:

-Ca: Capacity for addiction.

Measures the extent to which the content generated by the AI encourages repetitive and continuous consumption. This scale aims to provide a link between these video-generating AIs and social media (Wang et al., 2019; Zheluk et al., 2022), which promote user addiction as a business model.

Scale (1–3):

- 1: Low capacity to engage the user.
- 2: Moderate capacity.
- 3: High capacity (highly addictive).

Criteria to measure:

- Narrative engagement: Does the content follow patterns that encourage the user to continue using the generative application to create more videos? Measurable through surveys on intent to reuse the AI.
- Personalisation: Does the content respond to the user's prior preferences? Greater personalisation increases the level. Also measurable via surveys.
- Algorithmic recommendation: Does the system suggest automatically generated videos that prolong viewing time? Analysable through simple observation of the user interfaces of these AIs, such as Sora or MetaGen.

-Dv: Typical duration of generated videos.

Reflects the average length of content created by the AI. In the era of TikTok, as YouTube becomes a thing of the past, long videos are penalised, so shorter durations make videos more attractive to users living in a culture of immediacy and speed (Lopez & Polletta, 2021; Maryani et al., 2020); the so-called short attention span.

Scale (1–3):

- 1: Long duration (lower disruptive impact).
- 2: Medium duration.
- 3: Short duration (higher disruptive impact).

Criteria to measure (objectively measurable):

- Short duration: Videos of 10–30 seconds are more disruptive because they encourage mass consumption in a short time.
- Medium duration: Between 1 and 5 minutes.
- Long duration: Over 5 minutes, tend to be less disruptive as they require greater attention and commitment; this occurs due to the technical complexity of creating long videos, which demand more processing for the GAI to maintain consistency in moving images, although options are expanding to longer durations as the technology improves.

-Rp: Response to complex prompts.

Measures the AI's ability to interpret and generate sophisticated content based on detailed instructions. A video-generating AI that responds to highly complex prompts will be far more disruptive than one that does not, as it can address more challenges posed by users, making it more appealing to them by providing reward-responses (Batbold, 2024).

Scale (1–3):

- 1: Limited or uncreative response.
- 2: Acceptable response with some precision and creativity.
- 3: Highly precise, creative, and appropriate response, even with complex prompts.

Criteria to measure:

- Prompt comprehension: Does the AI respond accurately to requests with multiple levels of detail? Measurable through surveys.
- Creativity: Is the generated content original and not repetitive? Measurable through surveys.
- Precision: Does the content acceptably meet the user's requests? Measurable through surveys.

The denominator includes a single variable:

-Tr: Average rendering time.

Represents the efficiency in the time it takes the AI to generate a video. Audiences will find fast rendering times more attractive, i.e., minimal waiting, so AIs with longer rendering times will be penalised with less user interest.

Scale (1–3):

- 1: Slow (over 10 minutes for a 1–3 minute video).
- 2: Moderate (between 3 and 10 minutes).
- 3: Fast (under 3 minutes).

Criterion to measure:

- Response speed in seconds: Time in seconds to produce a video of a given duration. Faster systems are typically more disruptive as they allow rapid iterations and mass production. Measurable objectively through direct observation.

For the four variables discussed, when values are obtained from other quantitative sources that do not follow the same range criterion (using percentages, decimal values, etc.), a simple linear interpolation operation can keep them within the 1–3 range, as shown in equation (2).

$$Value_{adjusted} = \frac{Data_{measured} - Value_{minimum}}{Value_{maximum} - Value_{minimum}} \times 2 + 1 \quad (2)$$

The acquisition of these four variables could be the subject of future social measurement and parametrisation studies beyond the preliminary proposal presented here, but the authors have sought to outline some possibilities.

Using the listed parameters, results could be evaluated as follows:

$Fd < 1$: Low disruptive factor. The disruptive AI technology has a positive societal impact.

$1 \leq Fd < 3$: Moderate disruptive factor. Measures should probably be taken to mitigate negative effects, or at the very least, the AI service should be monitored.

$Fd \geq 3$: High disruptive factor. The disruptive AI technology may have a negative societal impact and should be considered for limitation. The higher the value above 3, the greater the disruptive capacity.

The proposed formula seeks to offer an objective approach to evaluating the potential impact of a disruptive technology on a society. However, it is a simplified approximation that does not encompass the full complexity of the issue, though it serves as a starting point. The weighting of different aspects is subjective and may vary by context. The variables used, inspired by social media usage and criteria measurable through surveys or observation of AI services, could be replaced by others depending on the case. Nevertheless, the authors consider that this approach, based on four variables (three in the numerator and one in the denominator), offers a simple and easily interpretable arithmetic formula.

Let us consider a possible application example. Suppose a generative video AI—in this example, we have taken data from Sora—has a high impact on addiction capacity ($Ca=3$) (Franganillo, 2023; Parikh, 2024), a moderate impact on the duration of generated videos ($Dv=2$) (Emmerson, 2023), a medium impact in terms of correct response to complex prompts ($Rp=2$) (Mogavi et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024), and offers moderate rendering times ($Tr=2$) (Daniella, 2024). Implementing these in (1), the Disruptive Factor would be:

$$Fd = (3 + 2 + 2) / 2 = 3.5$$

In this case, the video generation AI service exhibits a high Disruptive Factor, driven primarily by the Ca and Dv variables. Therefore, it is necessary to study it in depth to assess its potential negative societal effects, which could be comparable to those of the most harmful social media platforms, and take action accordingly; currently, Sora is not available in Europe, so we can judge the consequences of its use in other territories (Davies, 2024). One possible solution, as discussed, would be to treat disruptive technologies similarly to pharmaceuticals before market release, subjecting them to controlled trials in small groups to assess their potential dangers (Quiroga, 2024). This approach, which seems a common-sense measure based on caution, is not currently applied. Instead, these technologies are launched

directly to the public without proper evaluation, exposing users to the risk of unforeseen negative effects, who, attracted by novelty and fear of missing out, become experimental subjects (Kimbrough, 2024), something from which Europe is currently exempt, as the European AI directive imposes certain restrictions on use and access for training such large networks (Casals, 2023), strictly regulating generative image montages, deepfakes, disinformation, and other negative consequences of GAI use. However, when issues arise, countries must bear the burden of managing them, while the creators of these technologies often face no responsibility (Girasa, 2020). This context highlights significant flaws in the current model, which is widely accepted globally. For these reasons, a scale like the one presented in this study is proposed, aiming to provide a more structured criterion for analysing and managing the impact of disruptive technologies.

In this article, the authors have designed the four calculation variables based on known addictive parameters modelled on video social media. Naturally, readers might consider a different calculation using other variables, for example, a social *Fd* targeting employment consequences for specialised video, film, and visual effects technicians due to the advent of these AIs. Another option could be using variables expressing the positive transformative potential of these technologies, evaluating aspects such as the ability to democratise content creation, improve accessibility to audiovisual production tools, or facilitate creative expression for individuals who, due to technical or economic limitations, could not previously access these possibilities. Nevertheless, the rapid evolution of generative video AI capabilities suggests that any evaluation framework must be flexible enough to adapt to new variables and contexts that, as these technologies mature and integrate more deeply into the social fabric, could emerge as critical factors for understanding their true disruptive impact.

When analysing the potential impact of technologies like Sora, MetaGen, and Veo 2, whose capabilities to generate high-quality audiovisual content are evolving at a dizzying pace, we face a situation where they could contribute to the proliferation of dangerous content, such as deepfakes, which, especially in a context where verifying content authenticity becomes increasingly complex, could have serious implications for social trust and democratic stability.

Enthusiasm for disruption continues to predominate, despite the complications certain technological innovations are generating in our societies. Even organisations like the European Union maintain specific calls for “Disruptive Projects,” such as the EUDIS initiative (Bendik, 2023). This panorama underscores the need to critically reflect on whether the current approach, moving from one technological disruption to another, is truly the most suitable path for sustainable and balanced progress; the proposed tool seeks to contribute to the debate by offering the possibility of using objective pre-evaluation methods to inform subsequent regulatory or legislative decisions.

3. Conclusions

Social media and disruptive events hold great power to transform society, but they can also have negative effects; the emergence of generative AIs, and currently video-generating AIs, appears to be a step forward in this chain of disruptions with yet unsuspected consequences. Finding a balance that allows us to harness their benefits without falling into their traps is essential. Education plays a crucial role in this process, equipping new generations with the tools needed to navigate this digital world critically and responsibly. The introduction of the Disruptive Factor proposes initiating a modest discussion towards a useful tool for evaluating the impact of these disruptive technologies on societies. It is important to note that this is an approximation, and deeper analysis based on quantitative evidence is required to approach the complexity of the issue. It is crucial to recognise that the rapid evolution of these technologies presents ongoing challenges and opportunities that merit further investigation. The Disruptive Factor (*Fd*) proposed here is presented as an initial attempt to quantify the impact of such technologies, though its application should be refined and expanded in future research to incorporate additional parameters that may become relevant as AI capabilities advance. A promising avenue for future exploration is the intersection of generative AI with ethical and legal frameworks, as, with the improving ability of AI-generated content to simulate reality, regulatory bodies must establish mechanisms to mitigate risks associated with disinformation, deepfakes, and the erosion of trust in audiovisual media. Comparative studies evaluating different regulatory approaches across jurisdictions could provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of various governance models. Likewise, future research could examine the psychological and cognitive effects of prolonged exposure to AI-generated media, considering that, given concerns about solipsism, cognitive dependency, and the reinforcement

of personalised echo chambers, longitudinal studies tracking behavioural and social changes over time would be instrumental in assessing the broader implications of this technological shift. In particular, understanding how these tools influence creative processes, self-perception, and critical thinking skills would be key to formulating strategies that maximise benefits while mitigating negative consequences. Another critical dimension to explore is the economic impact of generative AI on creative industries, as, while this study has discussed potential labour displacement and the restructuring of traditional workflows, more empirical data are needed to assess the extent of such changes. Future research could focus on case studies of industries that have already extensively integrated AI technologies, analysing patterns of adaptation, resilience, and potential pathways for human-AI collaboration. While the Fd metric offers a structured approach to evaluating disruption, alternative models could be developed to assess different facets of AI-driven transformation, considering that incorporating qualitative assessments of user perceptions, cultural reception, and unintended sociopolitical ramifications could provide a more nuanced understanding of technology's influence. Future research could also explore the potential of an Fd sub-index focused on positive innovation, identifying AI applications that foster creativity, accessibility, and new artistic paradigms without significant negative disruption. To conclude, the authors wish to note that the evolving landscape of generative AI requires interdisciplinary research efforts bringing together experts from fields such as computer science, psychology, media studies, law, and ethics, as collaborative initiatives involving academia, industry, and policy-making institutions could lead to a more holistic understanding of how to responsibly harness these powerful tools. Given the unprecedented speed of technological advancement, a proactive and adaptive research approach is essential to manage the complexities of AI integration into society. By adopting an open perspective, this study hopes to stimulate further discourse and encourage academics, industry professionals, and institutions to engage critically with the transformative potential of generative AI, as, although the path ahead remains uncertain, through ongoing research and informed dialogue, it may be possible to shape the future of these technologies in a way that balances innovation with ethical and social responsibility.

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